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LITIGATION
UNITED STA TES
SUPREME COURT

Nordlinger v. Hahn,

_U.S._, 92 D.A.R. 8196,
No. 90-1912 (June 18, 1992).
Proposition 13 Upheld
On June 18, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld Proposition 13 against the equal
protection challenge filed by the Center
for Law in the Public Interest (CLIP!).
[ 11: 1 CRLR 156-57J The Court refused to
apply the strict scrutiny test that is required when an alleged equal protection
violation jeopardizes exercise of a fundamental right or categorizes on the basis
of an inherently suspect characteristic; in
the absence of heightened scrutiny, the
Court applied a standard of review which
asks only whether the difference in
Proposition 13's property tax treatment
between newer and older homeowners rationally furthers a legitimate state mterest.
The Court had "no difficulty" finding "at
least" two rational reasons for the difference in treatment: a legitimate state interest in local neighborhood preservation,
continuity, and stability, such as protection against gentrification; and the belief
that the state legitimately can conclude
that "a new owner at the time of acquiring
his property does not have the same
reliance interest warranting protection
against higher taxes as does an existing
owner.... [A]n existing owner rationally
may be thought to have vested expectations in his property or home that are more
deserving of protection than the anticipatory expectations of a new owner at
the point of purchase."
The Court distinguished Allegheny
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Webster County,
488 U.S. 336 (1989), relied upon by
Nordlinger, as a "rare case where the facts
precluded any plausible inference that the
reason for the unequal assessment practice
was to achieve the benefits of an acquisition-value tax scheme." As to claims that
Proposition 13 "frustrates the 'American
Dream' of home ownership for many
younger and poorer California families,"
the Court said that it does seem that
"California's grand experiment appears to
vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and
entrenched segment of society, and, as the
Court of Appeal surmised, ordinary
democratic processes may be unlikely to
prompt its reconsideration or repeal."
Nonetheless, the Court was not inclined to

"upset the will of the people of California."
In lone dissent, Justice Stevens argued
that neither of the state interests cited by
the majority meets the rational basis test.
Although he agreed that neighborhood
preservation is a legitimate state interest,
Justice Stevens concluded that a tax
windfall for all persons who purchased
property prior to 1978 does not rationally
further that interest; it is "too blunt a tool
to accomplish such a specialized goal." As
for the second rationale, "if... a law creates
a disparity, the State's interest preserving
that disparity cannot be a 'legitimate state
interest' justifying that inequity .... [A]
statute's disparate treatment must be justified by a purpose distinct from the very
effects created by that statute" (emphasis
original). Stevens interpreted the Court's
prior decisions as declaring irrational any
attempt to treat similarly situated people
differently on the basis of the date they
joined a particular class. He stated that it
would "obviously be unconstitutional to
provide one with more or better fire or
police protection than the other; it is just
as plainly unconstitutional to require one
to pay five times as much in property taxes
as the other for the same government services."

New York v. United States,

_U.S._, 92 D.A.R. 8784,
No. 91-543 (June 19, 1992).
Waste Act Properly Allocates
Power Between Federal and State
Governments
On June 19, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld a provision of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments
Act of 1985 requiring states to either find
a regional dump or build one of their own
by January I, I 993. By a 9-0 vote, the
Court ruled that the find-or-build requirement of the Act does not violate the tenth
amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
which reserves to the states all powers not
specifically granted to the federal government in Article I of the Constitution. There
is no violation because Congress gave the
states a choice: "States may eitherregulate
the disposal of radioactive waste ... by attaining local or regional self-sufficiency,
or their residents who produce radioactive
waste will be subject to federal regulation
authorizing states [that have their own
dumps] to deny access to their disposal
sites."
In another part of the same decision,
the Court struck down the so-called "take
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title" provision of the Act, which requires
any state that does not have a disposal site
to take ownership of and legal responsibility for all low-level radioactive wastes produced in that state after 1996. The
Court ruled that the "choice" here was
between two unconstitutionally coercive
alternatives: either accept ownership of
the waste or regulate according to
Congress' instructions. While it is proper
for Congress to give states positive incentives to take on a regulatory activity, "[n]o
matter how powerful the federal interest
involved, the Constitution simply does not
give Congress the authority to require the
states to regulate," wrote Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor for the 6-3 majority on this
issue. Strong dissents were written by Justices White and Stevens with Justice
Blackmun providing the other dissenting
vote. Constitutional scholars noted that
this decision marks only the second time
since 1937 that the Court has struck down
federal legislation on grounds it exceeds
Congress' power under Article I of the
Constitution. The tenth amendment is now
a basis for declaring federal laws unconstitutional.

NINTH CIRCUIT
COURT OF APPEALS
Assembly of the
State of California v. U.S.
Department of Commerce,

968 F.2d 916, 92 D.A.R. 15217,
No. 92-15217 (July 1, 1992).
Computer Tapes of 1990 Census
Are Not Exempt from
Freedom of Information Act
In this proceeding, the Department of
Commerce (DOC) appealed a decision of
the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of California requiring it to release
computer tapes containing statistically adjusted figures from the 1990 census to the
Assembly under the federal Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. section
552 et seq.
Because statisticians have recognized
that the decennial census undercounts the
actual number of persons living in the
United States, particularly among urban
minority populations, the DOC's Census
Bureau has developed a method to adjust
for that undercount. Specifically, the
Bureau starts with the actual enumeration
resulting from the head count (the unadjusted data), conducts a post-enumeration
survey sampling 170,000 housing units,
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and develops an adjustment factor which
estimates the extent to which specific
statistical categories were incorrectly
counted in the initial enumeration, thus
enabling the Bureau to produce an adjusted census. Although both the Undercount Steering Committee within the Census Bureau and the Director of the Census
recommended that the adjusted census
data be adopted as the official United
States census, the DOC Secretary announced his decision not to adopt the adjusted census, stating that it had not been
proven to be more accurate than the unadjusted census.
Following that announcement, the Assembly made a FOIA request for the formulas used to create the adjusted census
data, including "census population data
for California, by block and census tract,
broken down by race and age ... after adjustment in accordance with the postenumeration survey taken by the Bureau
of the Census in 1990." DOC denied that
request, contending that the tapes are
protected by FOIA Exemption 5 's
deliberative process privilege, 5 U.S.C.
section 552(b )(5), which protects documents that are both "predecisional" and
"deliberative."
In considering whether the adjusted
census tapes are predecisional, the court
noted that a document may be considered
predecisional if it was prepared in order to
assist an agency decisionmaker in arriving
at his/her decision. The court noted that
DOC official Mark Plant had reviewed a
sample of the adjusted data, but that
sample was not released to the public "because it did not enter in any way direct or
indirect into the Secretary's decision."
The court found that "[m]aterial which
predates a decision chronologically, but
did not contribute to that decision, is not
predecisional in any meaningful sense."
Regarding DOC's claim that the tapes
are "deliberative" material, the court
noted that a useful rule of thumb in examining the deliberative process privilege
requires the court to contrast "factual" and
"deliberative" materials; the idea behind
this distinction is that agencies have no
legitimate interest in keeping the public
ignorant of the facts from which the agencies worked, while they do have a
legitimate interest in shielding their
preliminary opinions and explorations.
The Ninth Circuit noted that the district
court had "analyzed the requested tapes to
see where they fell along the continuum of
deliberation and fact, and found that they,
like the unadjusted census data from
which they were derived, fell closer to fact
and would not reveal the agency's protectable thought processes"; the Ninth Cir240
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cuit held that this finding was not clearly
erroneous. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the district court's decision requiring that the computer tapes be
released to the Assembly; on September
17, the Ninth Circuit rejected DOC's petition for rehearing and its request for
rehearing en bane.

Senate of the State of
California v. U.S. Department of
Commerce,
968 F.2d 974, 92 D.A.R. 9363,
No. 91-55887 (July 6, 1992).
Senate Cannot Use Census Statutes
or Constitution to Compel
Discovery
While the California Assembly was
seeking disclosure of the computer tapes
containing the adjusted census data
through a FOIA request (see supra), the
California Senate was attempting to obtain the same information by contending
that release is required by the Constitution, the census statutes (13 U.S.C. section
I et seq.), and the Voting Rights Act (42
U.S.C. section 1973); the Senate did not
seek release of the tapes pursuant to FOIA.
The U.S. District Court for the Central
District of California granted a preliminary injunction ordering the release of the
adjusted census figures, concluding that
the Senate would be irreparably harmed if
not provided with the adjusted census calculations for use in the state's redistricting
process. The district court found no harm
at all to the DOC, which had already calculated and prepared the adjusted figures,
and had even been ready to send them out
to the states.
The Senate argued that because the
Constitution provides for a census based
upon an "actual Enumeration" of the
people in this country, there is a right to an
accurate count. Moreover, the Senate argued that because Congress delegated the
task of taking the census to the DOC
Secretary and directed the Secretary to
produce the census report data to the President and the states, the State of California
is entitled to the adjusted census information. The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that the Secretary has in fact
conducted the census and reported the
results, as required by law. The court concluded that neither the census statutes nor
the Constitution offer a basis for the
Senate's demands, noting that the Senate
is attempting "to use the Constitution and
the census statutes as freedom of informa-

tion laws so that it can obtain release of
that governmental data." The court added
that "[w]hile Congress can undoubtedly
direct release of information, .. .it has not
done so in the census statutes."
The Senate also argued that the Voting
Rights Act imposes an implied duty on the
DOC Secretary to prevent "the implementation of voting changes (e.g., redistrictings) that would have a 'retrogressive'
effect upon minority voting rights in certain jurisdictions, including four counties
in California." According to the court,
"[i]f the State knows that the census data
is [sic] underrepresentati ve, it can, and
should, utilize noncensus data in addition
to the official count in its redistricting
process." Ignoring the fact that this was
the purpose for the Senate's attempt to
obtain DO C's adjusted data, the court concluded that "[i]t is the state's responsibility, and not the Secretary's, to satisfy
the mandates of the Voting Rights Act."
Although acknowledging that "large numbers of Blacks, Hispanics, Asian-Pacific
Islanders, and Native Americans were
missed" by the unadjusted census data, the
court concluded that none of the laws
relied upon by the Senate give it the nght
to compel the Secretary to release the
tapes.
In a terse dissent, Justice Harry Pregerson commented that the official 1990 census data missed over five million people,
one million of whom reside in California.
Pregerson opined that "[b]y refusing to
disclose the adjusted census data, the
Secretary may have impermissibly interfered with the Senate's duty to redistrict
congressional and state legislative seats
under the United States Constitution and
under the Voting Rights Act. As the
majority points out, .. .it is for the state to
satisfy the mandates of the Voting Rights
Act.. ..lt is not for us, nor for the Census
Bureau, to decide whether the data will aid
California in its attempt to comply with
the Voting Rights Act or to correct inequities in its redistricting." Pregerson added
that "the Senate and the public will be
irreparably injured by denying the requested preliminary injunction. This injury far outweighs any possible injury the
Secretary may suffer."

California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 12, No. 4 (Fall 1992)

LITIGATION
UNITED STATES
DISTRICT COURTS
Gomez v. Gates,
_F.Supp._, 92 D.A.R. 10875,
No. CV 90-0856 JSL
(July 31, 1992).
Attorneys in Undesirable Cases
Are Eligible For Lodestar Amount
Plus Multiplier Fees
In this proceeding, the U.S. District
Court for the Central District considered
whether attorneys who provide successful
representation in "undesirable cases" are
entitled to an award of attorneys' fees
using the lodestar method (multiplying the
number of hours reasonably expended on
the matter by a reasonable hourly rate) and
a multiplier (a number by which the lodestar would be multiplied to determine the
final fee).
The court noted that although the U.S.
Supreme Court's recent decision in City of
Burlington v. Dague, 60 U.S.L.W. 4717
( 1992), held that there may be no enhancement of a fee award beyond the lodestar
amount to reflect the fact that a party's
attorneys were retained on a contingent
fee basis, that decision did not address
whether the undesirability of a case may
be a basis for enhancing a fee otherwise
determined by a simple lodestar calculation; the court defined the term "undesirable cases" as those in which the
plaintiff is unlikely to prevail for reasons
having nothing to do with the merits of the
claim or the quality of the attorney's performance. For example, the court commented that in some civil rights cases,
"primarily those involving use of allegedly excessive force by police against unattractive plaintiffs ... it is extremely difficult
for the plaintiff to prevail, and virtually
impossible to obtain a recovery large
enough to support a reasonable fee. This
is so regardless of the merits of the claim,
or the skill, experience or diligence of
counsel....Jurors have no desire to believe
criminals, or to reward them even if the
jurors chance to believe their stories."
The court found support for this contention in the facts of the underlying action for which the attorneys were requesting fees. In that action, the Los Angeles
Police Department's Special Investigation
Section witnessed four people robbing a
McDonald's restaurant. After allowing the
suspects to get into their vehicle, the officers boxed in that vehicle with police
cars and proceeded to fire approximately

twenty shotgun rounds into the car, a large
numberofwhich struck the suspects. After
this initial barrage, one officer shot and
killed one of the suspects who was attempting to flee the scene; another officer
shot a second suspect, who was already
fatally or near-fatally wounded, through
the top of the head from a distance of two
feet; the same officer then shot another
suspect (the only one to survive) in the
stomach from a distance of about eighteen
inches; and another officer then shot the
fourth suspect, who also was already fatally or near-fatally wounded, from approximately the same distance. In a lawsuit filed by the one surviving suspect and
the survivors of the three dead suspects,
the jury held liable all of the officers who
fired shots and former Los Angeles Police
Chief Daryl Gates; however, the jury
awarded no compensatory damages and
awarded a total of $44,000 in punitive
damages to the plaintiffs.
The court found that because it is difficult for plaintiffs in unattractive cases to
prevail for reasons unrelated to the relative
merits of the claim or to the difficulties in
establishing those merits which are ordinarily reflected in the lodestar, a fee
computation which considers only those
two factors is not reasonable and will not
attract lawyers to take those cases. Accordingly, the court concluded that a multiplier of 1.75 must be used to reflect the
peculiarly undesirable nature of this case
from the standpoint of a lawyer who
regularly accepts employment on a contingent fee basis.

CALIFORNIA SUPREME
COURT
Christopher v. Fair Political
Practices Commission,
No. S025815, 92 D.A.R. 11630
(Aug. 20, 1992).
Court Agrees to Hear Petition to
Resurrect Proposition 68
On August 20, the California Supreme
Court granted review of California Common Cause's petition for a writ of mandate
seeking reinstatement of Proposition 68,
the campaign financing reform measure
passed by the voters in 1988. Proposition
68 (which included campaign contribution limits, expenditure limits, and a
public financing mechanism for statewide
and legislative races) was held inoperative
in its entirety by the California Supreme
Court in 1990 because a competing
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measure, Proposition 73, had garnered a
larger majority. Reinstatement of Proposition 68 became a possibility when the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld a district court decision that major
portions of Proposition 73's campaign
financing "reforms" unconstitutionally
discriminate against electoral challengers.
[/2:2&3CRLR 273-74; 11:1 CRLR 153;
8:2 CRLR I]

CALIFORNIA COURTS
OF APPEAL
Roberts v. City of Palmdale,
7 Cal.App.4th 1130, 92 D.A.R.
9230, No. B063688
(June 30, 1992).
Palmdale City Council Followed
Improper Closed Session
Procedure
At the request of the Palmdale City
Council, the City's attorney prepared a
memorandum discussing an appeal from a
decision of the City's Planning Commission. Without first stating publicly its intent to do so, the City Council considered
its attorney's memorandum in a closed
session and refused to disclose it to plaintiff, an interested party. Plaintiff contended that the Council's efforts to keep
the memorandum confidential violated
both the Ralph M. Brown Act, Government Code section 54950 et seq., and the
Public Records Act, Government Code
section 6250 et seq.
In considering whether the City's actions violated the Brown Act, the Second
District Court of Appeal noted that the
Brown Act "compels public agencies to
conduct their business openly." and that
writings distributed to the members of a
city council by an employee or agent of
the counci I for discussion or consideration
at a public meeting are public records
under the Public Records Act unless the
writing is exempt from public disclosure
under specified sections of the Public
Records Act. The court acknowledged that
under Government Code section 6254(k),
disclosure is not required of records "the
disclosure of which is exempted or
prohibited pursuant to federal or state law,
including, but not limited to, provisions of
the Evidence Code relating to privilege."
Although agreeing that the memorandum
qualifies as a confidential communication
between lawyer and client within the
meaning of the attorney-client privilege,
the court noted that the analysis does not
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end there. Instead, the court found that the
Council's "decision to address the issue in
a closed session on the ground it relates to
pending Ii ligation and is therefore
privileged must be made and announced
publicly prior to the closed session. This
procedure was not followed" (emphasis
original).
The court also rejected the City's argument that the memorandum is exempt as
the attorney's work product unrelated to
litigation, finding that "[c]ommunications
between the City Council and its attorney
unrelated to 'pending litigation' within the
meaning of section 54956.9 must be disclosed (unless exempted for some other
unrelated reason) and cannot be withheld
in reliance upon some perceived permeation of the attorney-client relationship."
The court concluded that had the
Council complied with the Brown Act by
publicly announcing prior to the public
hearing its intent to consider the
memorandum in a closed session, the
memorandum would not be subject to disclosure. The court hrld that, in this case,
the Council's failure to comply with the
statutorily compelled procedure constitutes a waiver of the pending litigation
privilege, and ordered that a writ of mandate be gramed compelling the Council to
disclose the memorandum.
The California Supreme Court granted
the City of Palmdale's petition for review
on October 1.

Freedom Newspapers, Inc., v.
Orange County Employees
Retirement System Board of
Directors,
9 Cal.App.4th 134, 92 D.A.R.
12312, No. G011490
(Aug. 31, 1992).

LITIGATION
any similar formal action of a legislative
body or member of a legislative body of a
local agency." The court found that there
is no doubt that the retirement system's
board of directors, which consists of nine
members, falls within at least two of the
Act's definitions of the term "legislative
body."
However, the dispute in this case is
whether the board's four-person committees also fall within the definition. The
court noted that if the committees are advisory, they would fall under the definition
of the term "legislative body" contained in
Government Code section 54952.3; however, language at the end of that section
exempts from its definition a committee
composed solely of members of the
governing body of a local agency which
are less than a quorum of such governing
body. It is upon this proviso that the retirement board relies in denying public access
to its committee meetings.
However, the court found that the
board's committees also fall within the
scope of Government Code section
54952, which defines the term "legislative
body" to include "any board, commission,
committee, or other body on which officers of a local agency serve in their official capacity as members and which is
supported in whole or in part by funds
provided by such agency, whether such
board, commission, committee or other
body is organized and operated by such
local agency or by a private corporation."
Noting that the "less-than-a-quorum" exception contained in section 54952.3
"does nothing to affect bodies that fall
within the definition of 'legislative body'
under section 54952," the court held that
meetings of the various committees of the
board must be open to the public under the
terms of the Brown Act.
The board intends to appeal the Fourth
District's decision.

Brown Act Requires Committee
Meetings of a Retirement System
to be Open to the Public
In this proceeding, the Fourth District
Court of Appeal considered the proper
interpretation of the Brown Act as it applies to the Orange County Employees
Retirement System's board of directors'
committee meetings. The court initially
noted that the Brown Act requires all
meetings of the legislative body of a local
agency to be open and public. The Act
includes several definitions of the term
"legislative body," including "[a]ny advisory commission, advisory committee
or advisory body of a local agency, created
by charter, ordinance, resolution, or by
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